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Judges Henry J. Friendly and
Benjamin Cardozo: A Tale of Two
Precedents
David M. Dorsen*
Judge Henry J. Friendly, who served on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1959 to 1986,
confronted two cases raising precisely the same issues that
occupied Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo‟s attention forty years
before, when he served on the New York Court of Appeals, the
state‟s highest court. In 1923 Judge Cardozo wrote the court‟s
opinion in Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co.,1 examining whether
Cunard could avoid liability when a passenger with a claim
against it failed to send it a notification or file suit within the
time required by language printed on the passenger‟s ticket.
Five years later, soon after he became chief judge of that court,
Cardozo wrote the court‟s majority opinion in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R.,2 “„[p]erhaps the most celebrated of all torts cases‟
and one of the best-known American common law cases of all
time,”3 which concerned a railroad‟s liability for an arguably
* © 2011 by David M. Dorsen. A.B. Harvard, J.D. Harvard Law School.
Dorsen is writing a biography of Judge Henry J. Friendly (1903-86). Dorsen
wishes to thank James R. Zazzali, former Chief Justice of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, for his constructive comments, and the law firm of Wallace
King Domike & Reiskin, PLLC, for its generous support.
1. 139 N.E. 226 (N.Y. 1923).
2. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
3. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 287 (1998) (quoting William L.
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1953)). For a discussion of
the reasons why the case is so famous, see RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A
STUDY IN REPUTATION 41-47 (1990). At the time Judge Cardozo wrote the
Palsgraf opinion, the issue of foreseeability had been the subject of English
opinions and had been extensively discussed by legal scholars, almost all of
whom favored the view taken by the dissent (which supported Mrs. Palsgraf),
by fixing on whether any force intervened between the tortious act and the
harm. Arthur L Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent
Act, 39 YALE L.J. 449 (1930). Thirty-four years later, Professor Goodhart
wrote to Friendly that while a railroad might foresee that the package in
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unforeseeable accident. Decades later, Friendly shed new light
on Cardozo‟s venerable opinions.
Judge Friendly revered Judge Cardozo, listing him, along
with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Louis Dembitz Brandeis, and
Learned Hand, as the greatest judges of the twentieth
century.4 He also cited them frequently in his opinions,
mentioning Cardozo more often than Brandeis, although less
often than Holmes.5 Most of all, Judge Friendly primarily
referred to Cardozo as a judge, and not Justice, because his
most famous opinions were handed down while on the New
York Court of Appeals. Friendly appreciated Cardozo‟s pithy
aphorisms and wove them into his opinions. Among Judge
Cardozo‟s statements that Judge Friendly employed were:
“[T]he criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered”;6 “Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior [for a
fiduciary]”;7 “[W]e are not to close our eyes as judges to what
we perceive as men”;8 and “It will not do to decide the same
question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite
way between another.”9 More technical Cardozo statements
also attracted Judge Friendly‟s attention: “Our concern is to
define the meaning [of the statutory term] for the purpose of a
Palsgraf contained an explosive, “it would be unreasonable to require the
railway in every instance to act as if the contents of the package were of this
dangerous nature.” Letter from Arthur L. Goodhart to Henry J. Friendly
(Nov. 27, 1964) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library (Henry J.
Friendly Collection, Box 95, Folder 5)).
4. Henry J. Friendly, Judge Learned Hand, 29 BROOK. L. REV. 6, 6-7
(1962), reprinted in HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 309 (1967).
5. According to my count, Friendly cited Holmes in 78 of his opinions,
Cardozo in 57, and Brandeis in 53.
6. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926), quoted in Collins v.
Beto, 348 F.2d 823, 831 (5th Cir. 1965).
7. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928), quoted in
Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1344 (2d Cir. 1971).
8. People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 129 N.E.202, 208
(N.Y. 1920), quoted in Donovan v. Bierworth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir.
1982).
9. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS 33 (1921), quoted in
Estate of Carter v. Comm‟r, 453 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Noonan v.
Cunard S.S. Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71 n.2 (2d Cir. 1967); SEC v. Canandaigua
Enters., 339 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1964).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/3

2

2011]

A TALE OF TWO PRECEDENTS

601

particular statute which must be read in light of the mischief to
be corrected and the end to be attained”10 and “We must know
what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say
whether it is right or wrong.”11
While Judge Friendly‟s respect for Judge Cardozo was
enormous, he was not willing to follow uncritically the master‟s
precepts. He marched to his own internal judicial drummer.
Part of the reason was that in dealing with two important
problems, the usually prescient Judge Cardozo was more
reluctant than usual to take a modern view, as he did in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company.12 Friendly wrote a
liberating opinion in both In re Kinsman Transit Company,13
which raised issues similar to Palsgraf, but in a fact pattern
that many would have thought existed only in law-school
examinations, and Silvestri v. Italia Societa per Azioni di
Navigazione,14 where the facts paralleled those in Murray.
Judge Friendly, a judge best known for his statutory opinions,
moved the common law forward in the best spirit of its
development.
Although
frequently
described
as
a
conservative,15 his perspective led him to be more generous to
plaintiffs than was Judge Cardozo.
10. Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158 (1934), quoted in United States
v. Capanegro, 576 F.2d 973, 979 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978). Friendly cited Cardozo
frequently in his academic writing. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a
Lawyer-Newly-Become-Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218 (1961), reprinted in FRIENDLY,
supra note 4.
11. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 294
U.S. 499, 511 (1935), quoted in ABC Air Freight Co. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
391 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir. 1968).
12. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (abolishing the requirement of privity to
recover from the manufacturer of defective merchandise).
13. 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964).
14. 388 F.2d. 11 (2d Cir. 1968).
15. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 240 n.p (1981) (citing Sheldon Goldman, Conflict in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 1965-1971: A Quantitative Analysis, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 635,
647-50 (1973)); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL 304-05 (1998).
Friendly‟s reputation as a conservative stems largely from articles he wrote
on the criminal law, including: The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965); The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow:
The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968); and Is
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 142 (1970).
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Before Henry J. Friendly was a lawyer and a judge, he was
an aspiring historian. At Harvard College he studied old
European history under the prominent Harvard historian
Charles McIlwain, received his Bachelor of Arts degree summa
cum laude, and almost joined the Harvard History
Department.16 At Harvard Law School he became president of
the Harvard Law Review and again graduated summa cum
laude with the highest numerical grade-point average at the
school since Justice Brandeis, class of 1879. Fittingly, he then
clerked for Justice Brandeis himself.17 He was appointed fifty
years ago—after thirty-one years in private practice—to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where
he earned the title of outstanding federal appeals judge of his
generation, coupled with Learned Hand as one of the best
federal judges never to have made it to the Supreme Court.18
I.
Judge Friendly‟s opinion in Kinsman involved an incident
on the night of January 21, 1959, when two ice jams on the
16. McIlwain wrote to Friendly: “I have no hesitation in saying to you
that of all the students I have come in contact with in my whole teaching
experience of some twenty years, you are the best fitted for this work.” Letter
from Charles McIlwain, to Henry J. Friendly (Sept. 7, 1923) (on file with Joan
Friendly Goodman, daughter of Judge Friendly).
17. In re Howard, 210 F. Supp. 301, 302 (W.D. Pa. 1962). Justice
Brandeis had the highest average under a superseded grading system while
Friendly had the highest average under the new system. Audio Tape:
Friendly Oral History, held by the Center for Oral History (July 4, 1974) (on
file with author).
18. For example, Chief Justice Warren Burger said of Judge Friendly: “I
can‟t possibly identify any judicial colleague more highly qualified to have
come to the Supreme Court of the United States than Henry Friendly.” Chief
Justice Warren Burger, U.S. Supreme Ct., In Memoriam: Hon. Henry J.
Friendly, Address Before the Extraordinary Session of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit (June 9, 1986) in 805 F.2d LXXXVI. Justice Lewis
Powell said: “His intellect can be ranked with that of Paul Freund—the most
brilliant members of our profession I have ever known personally.” Letter
from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Ct., to Judge Louis H.
Pollak, Senior Dist. Judge, E. Dist. of Pa. (May 21, 1986) (on file with author).
Harvard Law School Dean Erwin N. Griswold stated: “In my opinion, he was
the ablest lawyer of my generation.” Erwin N. Griswold, In Memoriam: Henry
J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1720, 1720 (1986).
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Buffalo River broke loose after a “rain and thaw followed a
period of freezing weather.”19 Propelled by the current, large
chunks of ice and other debris lodged in the space between the
MacGilvray Shiras, a ship owned by Kinsman Transit and
Continental Grain Company, and the dock of the Concrete
Elevator, owned by Continental. The buildup exerted pressure
on the ship until the Shiras‟ “stern lines parted, and [she]
drifted into the current” at about 10:40 P.M.20 “Careening stern
first down the S-shaped river,” Judge Friendly explained, “the
Shiras, at about 11 P.M., struck the bow of the Michael K.
Tewksbury”—owned by another company—which had been
well-moored in a protected area.21 The collision pushed the
Tewksbury into the river and “she too drifted [downstream,
closely] followed by the Shiras.”22
Observers “called the Coast Guard, [who] called the city
fire station on the river, [who] in turn warned the crew on the
Michigan Avenue” drawbridge, located three miles downstream
from the Concrete Elevator.23 Although approximately twenty
minutes had passed since the accident and although it took just
two minutes and ten seconds to raise the drawbridge to full
height, “the bridge was just being raised when, at 11:17 P.M.,
the Tewksbury crashed into its center.”24 A shift change was
scheduled for 11 P.M.; the operator on the earlier shift was in a
tavern when the fire station call reached the bridge, and the
second shift did not arrive until shortly before a second call to
the bridge—and the crash.25 Grounded, the Tewksbury stopped
in the wreckage of the bridge against the stern of another ship
that was moored next to the bridge, and the Shiras plowed into
the Tewksbury.26 The ships and debris “substantially dammed
the flow [of the river], causing [it] to back up and flood
installations on the banks” as far upstream as the Concrete
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 712.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 712-13.
Id. at 713.
Id.
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Elevator.27 In addition to property damage, which included
damage to property adjacent to the bridge from its falling
towers, “[t]wo [members] of the bridge crew suffered injuries.”28
Claims, cross-claims, and third-party claims inundated the
U.S. district court in Buffalo.29 Sitting without a jury, District
Judge Harold P. Burke applied the federal law of admiralty to
decide who was liable and just how far a negligent party‟s
liability should reach down the chain of events.30 He also had to
decide claims between parties that were at least partially at
fault, like Continental, which docked the Shiras but also
suffered damage to the Concrete Elevator, and the City of
Buffalo, which was responsible for maintaining the river and
manning the drawbridge but found its drawbridge damaged
when two ships collided with it.31 In admiralty, unlike
negligence under the laws of most states, when a plaintiff as
well as a defendant is negligent, a court can reduce the award
to the victorious plaintiff because he was partially at fault;
when several parties are at fault, the judge can order them
share the damages in proportion to their culpability. 32 Judge
Burke made a variety of awards, which the Second Circuit
proceeded to review.33
Before taking up what he regarded as “the most serious
issues,” Judge Friendly made several preliminary findings.34
First, the City was not negligent for failure to take action to
prevent the buildup of ice on the river.35 Second, the manner of

27. Id.
28. Id. Judge Friendly had a passion for facts, and paid special attention
to them in his opinions. He would read the appendices to the parties‟ briefs as
well as the briefs themselves and, on occasion, he would ask for and examine
the entire trial-court record. Lawrence B. Pedowitz, Judge Friendly: A Clerk’s
Perspective, 1978 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xviii, xix (1979).
29. Id. at 711-14.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 2 C.J.S. Admiralty § 115 (2003). The law of admiralty does not utilize
the terms “plaintiff” and “defendant.” However, they are used here for
simplicity.
33. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 713.
34. Id. at 717.
35. Id. at 713-14.
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the mooring of the Shiras was negligent.36 Third, under the
arcane provisions of the admiralty law there were limitations
on the extent of Kinsman‟s liability because the owners of the
family corporation were insufficiently involved in the events to
impose full liability on the corporation.37 Fourth, the
Tewksbury and its owner Midland were not negligent in the
manner in which that ship was moored.38
That left three major issues, the first of which was the
City‟s failure to raise the bridge in time. Judge Friendly began:
“If this were a run of the mine negligence case, the City‟s
argument against liability for not promptly raising the
Michigan Avenue Bridge would be impressive.”39 No vessels
were expected—the tugs quit at 4 P.M.—“it would have been
consistent with prudence for the city to relieve the bridge crews
of their duties.”40 The City would not be liable “because out of
abundance of caution, it had ordered them to be present when
prudence did not so require.”41 However, this was no “run of the
mine negligence case.” The difference resided in section 4 of the
Federal Bridge Act of 1906,42 which required that when a
drawbridge is constructed over a navigable stream, “then the
draw shall be opened promptly by the persons owning or
operating such bridge upon reasonable signal for the passage of
boats and other water craft.”43 A federal regulation related to
the statute read: “The draws of these bridges shall be opened
promptly on signal for the passage of any vessel at all times
during the day or night except as otherwise provided by this
section.”44 No exception applied.45
The second major issue was the allocation of damages
between Kinsman and Continental, on the one hand, and the
City, on the other hand. “We speedily overrule the objections of
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 714.
Id. at 714-16.
Id. at 716-17.
Id. at 717.
Id.
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 494 (2006).
Id.
Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 718 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 203.707(e) (1961)).
Id.
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Kinsman and Continental . . . . [A]n actor whose negligence has
set a dangerous force in motion is not saved from liability for
harm it has caused to innocent persons solely because another
has negligently failed to take action that would have avoided
this.”46 The argument that someone down the line negligently
failed to stop the force and therefore should be the sole person
liable “grows out of the discredited notion that only the last
wrongful act can be a cause—a notion as faulty in logic as it is
wanting in fairness. The established principle [of sharing the
payment of damages] is especially appealing in admiralty,
which will divide the damages among the negligent actors or
non-actors.”47 The award of damages proportionate to a party‟s
fault eliminates the search for the sole blameworthy actor.
Thus, although some common law precedent supported
Kinsman and Continental, Judge Friendly concluded that
admiralty law precedent, although not absolutely clear, favored
the City.48
The third major issue was the relevancy of the fact that
“[t]he allegedly unexpectable character of the events [led] to
much of the damage.”49 Judge Friendly wrote: “The very
statement of the case suggests the need for considering
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. . . . and the closely related
problem of liability for unforeseeable consequences.”50 In
Palsgraf, an injury to Helen Palsgraf took place when a latearriving passenger, fighting his way onto a crowded moving
train assisted by a push by a railroad guard, dropped a
newspaper-covered package onto the tracks.51 Nothing
indicated the package contained fireworks, which exploded
when they hit the ground.52 The force of the detonation
overturned a penny weighing machine twenty-five or thirty feet

46. Id. at 719.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 718-21.
49. Id. at 721.
50. Id. at 721. The Palsgraf case, Judge Friendly noted, was
incorporated into the law of admiralty by an opinion written by Judge
Learned Hand. Id. (citing Sinram v. Pa. R.R., 61 F.2d 767, 770 (2d Cir. 1932).
51. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
52. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/3

8

2011]

A TALE OF TWO PRECEDENTS

607

away, perhaps less, and it fell on Mrs. Palsgraf.53 She sued the
Long Island Railroad for her injuries and won a jury verdict,
which the New York Appellate Division affirmed.54 New York‟s
highest court, however, reversed and dismissed the case in a
four-to-three opinion, with Judge Cardozo writing for the
majority.55
Judge Cardozo‟s opinion explained that, “the orbit of the
danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be
the orbit of the duty . . . . The risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is
risk to another or to others within the range of
apprehension.”56 Judge Friendly observed that Judge Cardozo
53. Id. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
54. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 225 N.Y.S. 412 (App. Div. 1927).
55. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99. Posner states that Cardozo‟s statement of
facts “is both elliptical and slanted” in favor of the railroad. POSNER, supra
note 3, at 38. For example, the book points out that Cardozo called the bundle
small even though witnesses had described it as large and that Cardozo said
nothing about the distance of the scale from the fall of the fireworks. Id. at
39. It was Judge Andrews‟ dissent that provided the information about the
location of the scale. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
Posner also described Judge Cardozo‟s opinion as an “audacious denial that
the railroad had been culpably negligent.” POSNER, supra note 3, at 40.
Friendly did not challenge Judge Cardozo‟s statement of the facts. In re
Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964). While the details of the
facts in Palsgraf were of limited relevance to his opinion in Kinsman, Judge
Friendly certainly recognized that the stronger the facts were for the
railroad, the easier it was to find in favor of plaintiffs in Kinsman. Id.
56. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100. Cardozo‟s use of the term “duty” was
standard at the time; Judge Andrews used the term. Id. at 102 (Andrews, J.,
dissenting). The dissent in Palsgraf took a broader and more practical view of
liability:
Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be
expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if
he be outside what would generally be thought the danger
zone . . . . But there is one limitation. The damages must be
so connected with the negligence that the latter may be said
to be the proximate cause of the former.
Id. at 103. The law stated in the dissent is the law in most states. POSNER,
supra note 3, at 41. Judge Posner was far too harsh on Judge Andrews when
he wrote, “Judge Andrews‟s dissent, which although much praised is inept.”
Id. at 45. Judge Andrews supplied important facts omitted by Judge Cardozo.
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting).

9
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had found “the Long Island Railroad owed no „duty‟ to Mrs.
Palsgraf under the circumstances,” although it might owe a
duty in other circumstances, such as “if Mrs. Palsgraf had been
injured by the fall of improperly loaded objects from a passing
train.”57 It had no duty because there was no “notice that the
package contained a substance demanding the exercise of any
care toward anyone so far away; Mrs. Palsgraf was not
considered to be within the area of apparent hazard created by
whatever lack of care the guard had displayed to the
anonymous carrier of the unknown fireworks.”58
Friendly compared Kinsman with Palsgraf: “We see little
similarity between the Palsgraf case and the situation before
us . . . . [A] ship insecurely moored in a fast flowing river is a
known danger not only to herself but to owners of all other
ships and structures down-river, and to the persons upon
them.”59 Foreseeable consequences included damage to the
bridge and “partial damming that would flood property
upstream,” particularly, as Judge Friendly noted, the length of
one of the two loose ships was two-and-one-half times and the
other was three times the width of the channel at the bridge.60
Also foreseeable was that the drawbridge would not be raised
“since, apart from other reasons, there was no assurance of
timely warning.”61 It may have been less foreseeable that the
Shiras would have made it so far down the river, but the
current was swift and, on learning of the Shiras‟ breaking
loose, Continental‟s employees and others “foresaw precisely
that.”62 Thus, “all the claimants here met the Palsgraf
requirement of being persons to whom the actors owed a „duty
of care‟ . . . .”63 “Although the obvious risks from not raising the
57. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 721 (2d Cir. 1964).
58. Id. Friendly employed a footnote to observe that “[t]here was
exceedingly little evidence of negligence of any sort. . . . How much ink would
have been saved over the years if the Court of Appeals had reversed Mrs.
Palsgraf‟s judgment on the basis that there was no evidence of negligence at
all.” Id. at n.5.
59. Id. at 721-22 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 722.
61. Id. at 723.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
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bridge were damage to itself and to the vessels, the danger of a
fall of the bridge and of flooding would not have been
unforeseeable under the circumstances to anyone who gave
them thought.”64 Judge Friendly cautioned that “such post hoc
step by step analysis would render „foreseeable‟ almost
anything that has in fact occurred; if the argument relied upon
has legal validity, it ought not be circumvented by
characterizing as foreseeable what almost no one would in fact
have foreseen . . . .”65
Judge Friendly still had to respond to the argument. He
stated:
that the manner in which several of the
claimants were harmed, particularly by the flood
damage, was unforeseeable and that recovery for
this may not be had—whether the argument is
put in the forthright form that unforeseeable
damages are not recoverable or is concealed
under a formula of lack of “proximate cause.”66
About this issue Judge Friendly later wrote to a Harvard
Professor: “I must confess there is no phase of law that seems
more baffling and unsusceptible of clear statement than the
causation problem.”67 This was not an issue that Palsgraf could
answer. “Chief Judge Cardozo did not reach the issue of
„proximate cause‟ for which the case is often cited.”68
64. Id. at 723.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 722-23 (emphasis added). This sentence was quintessential
Friendly. In a few words he described concepts that many might think were
identical while others would not see as even similar, and at the same time
expressed his preference for one of the formulations.
67. Letter from Henry J. Friendly, to Robert Keeton (Nov. 10, 1964) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library (Henry J. Friendly Collection, Box
211, Folder 13)).
68. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 722-23 & n.8. Cardozo had written:
The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to
the case before us. The question of liability is always
anterior to the question of the measure of the consequences
that go with liability. If there is no tort to be redressed,

11
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Judge Friendly‟s analysis favored plaintiffs: “The weight of
authority in this country rejects the limitation of damages to
consequences foreseeable at the time of the negligent conduct
when the consequences are „direct,‟ and the damage, although
other and greater than expectable, is of the same general sort
that was risked.”69 His discussion of foreseeability was
uncommonly clear and expansive, although, as he conceded, his
opinion provided little in the way of guidance and left much to
the intuition of the judge:
We see no reason why an actor engaging in
conduct which entails a large risk of small
damage and a small risk of other and greater
damage, of the same general sort, from the same
forces, and to the same class of persons, should
be relieved of responsibility for the latter simply
because the chance of its occurrence, if viewed
alone, may not have been large enough to require
the exercise of care. . . . This does not mean that
the careless actor will always be held for all
there is no occasion to consider what damage might be
recovered if there were a finding of a tort.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). Analysis of the
issue of proximate cause arguably should precede considerations of
foreseeability. If the tort did not cause the injury, there is no reason to
consider whether the injury was foreseeable.
69. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 724. Judge Friendly noted that English law
imposed liability when the injury was caused somewhat differently than
could be expected, providing the damages were “direct.” Id. at 723. He was
skeptical:
[W]e would find it difficult to understand why one who had
failed to use the care required to protect others in the light
of expectable forces should be exonerated when the very
risks that rendered his conduct negligent produced other
and more serious consequences to such persons than were
fairly foreseeable when he fell short of what the law
demanded.
Id. at 723-24. The parties‟ briefs in Kinsman had not mentioned English law.
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damages for which the forces that he risked were
a cause in fact. Somewhere a point will be
reached when courts will agree that the link has
become too tenuous—that what is claimed to be
consequence is only fortuity. Thus, if the
destruction of the Michigan Avenue Bridge had
delayed the arrival of a doctor, with consequent
loss of a patient‟s life, few judges would impose
liability on any of the parties here . . . . It would
be pleasant if greater certainty were possible,
but the many efforts that have been made at
defining the locus of the “uncertain and wavering
line” are not very promising; what courts do in
such cases makes better sense that what they, or
others, say.70
At this point Judge Friendly turned from a restatement of
the repeatedly explored law of foreseeability to an analysis that
included language perhaps reflecting the budding law and
economics movement, whose leaders included then professors
and now judges, Guido Calabresi71 and Richard A. Posner:72
Where the line will be drawn will vary from age
to age; as society has come to rely increasingly on
insurance and other methods of loss-sharing, the
point may lie further off than a century ago. Here
it is surely more equitable that the losses from
the operators‟ negligent failure to raise the
Michigan Avenue Bridge should be ratably borne
by Buffalo‟s taxpayers than left with the
innocent victims of the flooding . . . .73
70. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 725 (internal citations omitted).
71. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach
to Non-Fault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 725-34 (1965).
72. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (2007).
73. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 725-26. Judge Andrews‟ dissent in Palsgraf,
which focused on the issue of proximate cause, raised a hypothetical similar
to Friendly‟s delayed doctor, and said: “[I]t is all a question of expediency.
There are no fixed rules to govern our judgment. . . . There is in truth little to
guide us other than common sense.” Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 104 (Andrews, J.,
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In fact, a memorandum that Friendly wrote to his fellow judges
on the panel was more forward-looking than his statement in
his opinion:
If there were any way in which the doctrine could
be manipulated so as to correspond with
probable insurance that would be fine, and in our
case one may guess there to be more likelihood
that the property owners were insured against
flood damages than that Continental‟s liability
insurance would be equal to the strain. But
suppose Joe Doak, who was standing by the river
bank, had been drowned? On the whole, it seems
best not to bring into negligence law the
„foreseeability‟ doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale so
far as concerns damages rather than the
determination of negligence. . . . I submit that
importing foreseeability into determining the
scope of damages for negligence is unsound in
theory and unworkable in practice.74
The decree entered by the Second Circuit apportioned the
losses among the various responsible parties: Buffalo recovered
two-thirds of the damages to its property from Continental and
Kinsman; Continental recovered two-thirds of its damages from
the City and Kinsman; and Kinsman, which made no claim
against Continental, recovered half of the damages suffered by
the Shiras at the bridge from the City and Continental.75 More
than four decades after Kinsman, Judge Calabresi commented
on Judge Friendly‟s opinion: “I think Friendly was definitely

dissenting). At some point the two approaches converge. See Case Comment,
Proximate
Cause—Last
Clear
Chance—Admiralty:
Foreseeability
Requirement and the “Freak Accident,” 49 MINN. L. REV. 1052, 1058-59
(1965).
74. Memorandum from Henry J. Friendly, to Judges Leonard P. Moore
& Sterry R. Waterman (Apr. 13, 1964) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library (Henry J. Friendly Collection, Box 29, Folder 19)).
75. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 726-27.
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foreseeing law and economics type analysis. He was doing it
more through intuition than systematically. But . . . his judicial
intuition more often got it correct than the analysis of many a
law and economics scholar.”76
Judge Leonard P. Moore dissented only from the portion of
Judge Friendly‟s opinion that sustained the award of damages
caused by the flooding of the upstream properties. Judge Moore
took a different view of the foreseeability of the harm,
concluding that “the fortuitous circumstance of the vessels so
arranging themselves as to create a dam is much „too tenuous,‟”
and compared the events to “the humorous and almost-beyondall-imagination sequences depicted by the cartoonist . . . Rube
Goldberg,” hugely famous a half-century ago.77 Judge Moore‟s
principal concern was that “[j]udgment would be entered
against the defendant which court or jury decided was best able
to pay.”78 Thus, his analysis favored defendants and was less
forward-looking than Judge Friendly‟s, voting for the
defendants on this claim despite the fact that the injured
upriver property owners were far less able than the defendants
to protect against and distribute the costs of the accident
among a broader swath of people.
The parties provided Judge Friendly with precious little
help. When he saw that the briefs cited no rules or regulations
relating to the Bridge Act, his experience and intuition led him
to tell his law clerk, Pierre N. Leval, now a judge on the Second
Circuit, to go to the law library to see if there were any
applicable rules or regulations.79 Leval found the regulation
cited above that required drawbridges to be opened “promptly
on signal for the passage of any vessel at all times during the
day or night except as otherwise provided in this section.”80 The
uncovered regulation played an important role in the decision.

76. E-mail from Guido Calabresi, Senior Cir. Judge, 2d Cir., to author
(Sept. 18, 2008) (on file with author).
77. Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 727-28 (Moore, J., concurring and dissenting).
78. Id. at 727.
79. Interview with Pierre N. Leval, Senior Cir. Judge, 2d Cir., in N.Y.,
N.Y. (Oct. 17, 2006).
80. 33 C.F.R. § 203.707(e) (1961); Interview with Judge Pierre N. Leval,
supra note 79; see also supra text accompanying notes 34-44.
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The briefs of the four parties were deficient in other respects.
Incredibly, only one of the briefs filed so much as cited
Palsgraf; without any discussion or analysis the City‟s brief
simply quoted two short passages from Judge Cardozo‟s
majority opinion.81 The consideration of foreseeability in the
City‟s brief—again the only brief that even mentioned the
issue—was limited to the question of whether the City had any
expectation that ships would be on the Buffalo River that
night.82 Judge Friendly generously expanded the City‟s meager
and off-center argument on foreseeability.83
What is even more startling is that none of the briefs filed
in Kinsman were as good on the principal issue as the brief of
the Long Island Railroad in Palsgraf, argued thirty-six years
earlier and obviously without the benefit of Judge Cardozo‟s
opinion. Mrs. Palsgraf‟s brief limited itself to mundane
statements like: “The defendant having set in motion a chain of
events was liable for the result thereof.”84 The railroad‟s brief,
however, was surprisingly sophisticated for one written in the
late 1920s. Judge Richard Posner did not do it justice when he
wrote: “The opinion owes, by the way, nothing to the briefs,
which are competent and well written, but nothing more;
alongside Cardozo‟s opinion they are pedestrian”; “[t]he
railroad‟s brief is not markedly superior to the plaintiff‟s.”85
81. Brief for the City of Buffalo, In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708
(2d Cir. 1964) (No. 238-243, 28387-28392).
82. Id.
83. Friendly explained a legal rationale in a memorandum to the other
members of the panel: “Although the Palsgraf point was not specifically
argued, Continental‟s (and Kinsman‟s) claims that the City should be held
solely liable for everything and they for nothing, surely include the lesser
claim that they should not be held liable for damage from the damming and
flooding.” Memorandum from Henry J. Friendly, to Judges Leonard P. Moore
and Sterry R. Waterman (Mar. 4, 1964) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library (Henry J. Friendly Collection, Box 211, Folder 13)).
84. Plaintiff-Respondent‟s Brief from Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
reprinted in 2 RECORDS AND BRIEFS OF LANDMARK BENJAMIN CARDOZO
OPINIONS 10 (Doc. 20) (William H. Manz, ed. 2001). Judge Posner accurately
called Palsgraf‟s argument “standard analysis.” POSNER, supra note 3, at 37.
85. POSNER, supra note 3, at 45, 48. Judge Posner was correct to the
extent that his comment referred to considerations of style—an important
part of his discussion of Cardozo‟s legacy—but not necessarily considerations
applicable to a party trying to win a case.
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After arguing that its employees were not negligent, the
railroad‟s brief turned to the issue of causality.86 The railroad
first claimed an absence of proximate cause and then continued
with language that undoubtedly assisted Judge Cardozo to
write his landmark opinion and, indeed, gave him the
opportunity to jettison the arguably superfluous concept of
“duty”87 on which he nevertheless chose to rely:
Defendant‟s employees not knowing the contents
of the package carried by the passenger could not
reasonably foresee or anticipate that it might
explode. Such an occurrence is not a natural and
probable consequence of assisting a passenger to
board a train. . . . “In other words negligence is
not a matter to be judged after the occurrence; it
is always a question of what reasonably prudent
men under the same circumstances would or
should in the exercise of reasonable care have
anticipated.”
“We think that ordinary caution did not involve
forethought of this extraordinary peril.”
“[The defendant] became answerable in other
words for those consequences that ought to have
been foreseen by a reasonably prudent man.”88
Despite his seeming endorsement in Kinsman of Judge
Cardozo‟s product, it is far from clear that Judge Friendly was
enamored of Palsgraf‟s usefulness in the contemporary world.
86. Points for Appellant from Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. reprinted in 2
RECORDS AND BRIEFS OF LANDMARK BENJAMIN CARDOZO OPINIONS, supra note
84, at Doc. 19, 5-12.
87. The railroad may have seen that it adds little, if anything, to the
analysis to say that the railroad owed Mrs. Palsgraf a duty not to cause a
boarding passenger to drop a package on her foot but not a duty to cause the
passenger to drop a package that explodes. Duty seems to describe the result
rather than lead to it.
88. Points for Appellant from Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., supra note
86, at 6-8 (citations omitted).
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His Kinsman opinion noted: “Since all the claimants here met
the Palsgraf requirement . . . we are not obliged to reconsider
whether that case furnishes as useful a standard for
determining the boundaries [of liability] in admiralty for
negligent conduct as was thought . . . when Palsgraf was still in
its infancy.”89 Judge Friendly did not explain what he meant by
his statement, which certainly suggested a measure of
reservation, until four years after Kinsman in Ira S. Bushey &
Sons, Inc. v. United States,90 his only other opinion that
discussed Palsgraf. Bushey involved an inebriated seaman who
opened valves that flooded a drydock, causing serious
damage.91 Judge Friendly concluded: “The risk that seamen
going and coming from [their ship] might cause damage to the
drydock is enough to make it fair that the enterprise bear the
loss.”92 Significantly, he turned for support not to Judge
Cardozo, but to Judge Andrews, the author of the dissenting
opinion in Palsgraf, who seemed to take the more pragmatic
approach. Judge Friendly wrote:
It is not a fatal objection that the rule we lay
down lacks sharp contours; in the end, as Judge
Andrews said in a related context, “it is all a
question [of expediency] of fair judgment, always
keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to
make a rule in each case that will be practical
and in keeping with the general understanding
of mankind.”93

89. 338 F.2d at 722.
90. 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
91. Id. at 167.
92. Id. at 172. This conclusion contains strains of Professor Goodhart‟s
letter to Judge Friendly that while a railroad might foresee that the package
in Palsgraf contained an explosive, “it would be unreasonable to require the
railway in every instance to act as if the contents of the package were of this
dangerous nature.” See Letter from Arthur L. Goodhart, supra note 3.
Friendly, like Goodhart, was stepping away from an analysis based solely on
foreseeability.
93. Bushey, 398 F.2d at 172 (alteration in original) (quoting Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
Friendly saw merit in Judge Andrews‟ analysis.
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Judge Friendly seemed willing to discard Judge Cardozo‟s
concepts of duty and foreseeability in favor of a focus on basic
fairness and practicality and the growing concerns of law and
economics.
II.
The second case in which Judge Friendly confronted a
precedent written by Judge Cardozo—where the later judge
had even more serious reservations—involved the extent to
which a steamship company could hold a passenger to
notification and filing requirements printed on his ticket that
are more demanding than those imposed by the law. Silvestri v.
Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione94 grew out of an injury
to Ciro Silvestri while a transatlantic passenger from the
United States to Italy aboard the Italian Line‟s S.S. Leonardo
da Vinci. The district court granted summary judgment against
Silvestri because of his failure to begin the action within one
year, as required by Article 30 of the Terms and Conditions
printed on his ticket.95 A “box” in the upper right hand corner
of Silvestri‟s ticket was in Italian and English and bore the
words “PASSAGE CONTRACT.”96
Almost all of the captions in the “box” were in
capital or bold face letters, the major exception
being the following statements, which appeared
in the upper left hand corner of the ticket in
94. 388 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968).
95. Id. at 12-13. The first sentence of Article 30 read:
No action or proceeding against the Company for death or
injury of any kind to the passenger shall be instituted,
unless written notice is given to the Company or its duly
authorized Agent within six months from the day when the
death or injury occurred and the action or suit arising
therefrom is commenced within one year from the date
when the death or injury occurred.
Id. at 13 n.1.
96. Id. at 14.
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ordinary lower-case one-eighteenth inch type:
“Il presente biglietto di passagio è soggetto alle
condizioni stampate sulla copertina e sui fogli n°
1 e 2.
Subject to the conditions printed on the cover of
this ticket which form part of this contract.”
The inconspicuousness of these statements was
increased by the fact that they were squeezed
immediately below a caption in bold face and to
the left of one in capital letters. The two “leaves”
which are an integral part of the coupon retained
by the passengers were headed “TERMS AND
CONDITIONS” in bold face. Then followed 35
numbered paragraphs in very small print. At the
end were spaces for signature by or for the
passenger, but neither Silvestri nor any
representative signed.97
In his lawsuit Silvestri made the following important
concessions:
that he had the ticket in his possession for at
least three days before boarding the ship in New
York and [then while in transit to] Italy, that he
had looked at it prior to embarking, that he had
consulted a lawyer in Italy, who had [contacted]
the Italian Line without obtaining a satisfactory
offer of settlement, and that he had given no
written notice until the filing of the [suit more

97. Id. Friendly‟s opinion pointed out that the English version was
different from the Italian because the latter indicated “cover” and “leaves”
while the English referred just to “cover.” Id. at 17. Friendly mentioned this
discrepancy to reject any argument that Silvestri was misled; Silvestri‟s
deposition showed he understood both Italian and English. Id. at 18 n.6. So
did Friendly.
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than one year after his injury].98
The parties‟ briefs were cursory. The total number of pages
in the briefs of the parties, including statements of facts and
descriptions of the proceeding in the trial court, was eighteen
and they demonstrated no particular familiarity with the law
and little with the facts. Not only did the parties fail to provide
significant assistance to Judge Friendly, other possible sources
of aid likewise failed him. While Judge Friendly relied on some
treatises, such as Harvard Professor Louis Loss‟ treatise on
federal securities law, he received no help from treatises in
Silvestri. 99
At first blush the case seemed straightforward to the
Second Circuit panel. After argument, they voted unanimously
to affirm summary judgment entered in favor of defendant.100
When Judge Friendly‟s opinion surfaced seven weeks after oral
argument, however, it was written the other way—a
unanimous vote to reverse and remand for a trial. He began his
legal discussion with a caustic comment: “Silvestri‟s alternative
arguments for reversal rest on the applicability of two Supreme
Court decisions, The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375 (1897), and The
Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959),
neither of which has been cited by counsel.”101 Having chastised
Silvestri‟s lawyer, Judge Friendly got down to work. Silvestri
98. Id. at 12-13.
99. One famous treatise at the time said, “to be valid, a limitation [on a
passenger ticket] must be fair and reasonable and not contrary to the dictates
of public policy,” followed by a listing of some of the types of limitations. 10
SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1098 at 186-87 (3d ed. 1967). Footnotes cited representative
cases without indicating their facts or outcome. Id. at nn. 7-9 (discussing
Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 139 N.E. 226 (N.Y. 1923). Another leading
treatise discussed passengers who accepted a transportation ticket without
reading it: “He [a passenger] can not hold the insurer or carrier to a promise
other than that contained in the document because the latter has made no
other promise; and he can not have the contract set aside for mistake,
because he has made no mistake.” 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 607 at 661-62 (1960). Corbin,cited, inter alia, Murray, but provided no
discussion of the case. Id. at n.17.
100. Friendly Collection (on file with the Harvard Law School Library
(Henry J. Friendly Collection, Box 18, Folder 3)).
101. Silvestri, 388 F.2d at 13.
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could prevail “only if the judge erred in ruling that the
conditions were incorporated [into the passenger‟s contract],
decision of which requires us to go back to The Majestic,”102 a
case which he proceeded to discuss in prose rivaling Judge
Cardozo‟s in elegance.
That case stemmed from a misadventure of the
Misses Potter who, with their maid, had sailed
from Liverpool to New York in 1892. Despite the
improvements in transatlantic navigation since
the memorable voyage exactly four centuries
earlier, the estimable young ladies found on
disembarking that the contents of their trunks
had been badly damaged by sea water. When
they libeled the Majestic, they were met, among
other defenses, with a ticket provision limiting
liability “for loss of or injury to or delay in
delivery of luggage” to 10 pounds. The ticket
contained a “box” bearing the names of the
passengers, alongside which was an agreement of
carriage signed by the Oceanic Steam Navigation
Company. Underneath this was a “Notice to
Cabin Passengers” with provisions not relevant
to the issue save for a reference “See Back”; on
the back, under the rubric “Notice to
Passengers,” like that on the front in bold face
type, was a statement “This contract is made
subject to the following conditions,” including, in
fine type, the limitation of liability for luggage to
which we have referred. The attention of the
Misses Potter had not been called to this, nor had
either of them read it. In a unanimous opinion . .
. the Court allowed [the sisters] to recover . . .
[holding] that the limitations “were not included
in the contract proper, in terms or by
reference.”103
102. Id.
103. Id. at 13-14 (quoting The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375, 385 (1897)).
Friendly extravagantly praised Judge Cardozo‟s writing style in Friendly,
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It was time for Judge Friendly to discuss more recent
precedents. He explained that, “[j]udicial efforts to determine
what suffices to meet the rule of The Majestic have produced
distinctions of considerable nicety.”104 Two lines of authority
developed in the Second Circuit.105 Its early decisions ruled
against “incorporation” of the conditions into the agreement
between the passenger and the line, which meant the
passenger was not bound by them.106 A later and contrary line
of authority was based on Judge Cardozo‟s opinion in Murray v.
Cunard S.S. Co.107 Judge Cardozo recited:
The plaintiff‟s ticket . . . is described in large type
as a “cabin passage contract ticket.” It provides,
again in large type, that “this contract ticket is
issued by the company and accepted by the
passenger on the following terms and
conditions.” . . . At the top of the ticket is printed
a notice: “The attention of passengers is specially
directed to the terms and conditions of this
contract.”108
Despite the fact the passenger had apparently been required to
surrender the ticket on board the ship, Judge Cardozo
“enforced a 40 day notification requirement.”109 Reversing the
lower courts that had favored the plaintiff, Cardozo explained:
This is not a case of a mere notice on the back of
a ticket, separate either in substance or in form
from the body of the contract. The Majestic, 166
U.S. 375. Here the condition is wrought into the
supra note 4, at 11-13.
104. Silvestri, 388 F.2d at 14.
105. Id. at 15.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 139
N.E. 226, 227 (N.Y. 1923)).
109. Id.
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tissue, the two inseparably integrated. This
ticket, to the most casual observer, is as plainly a
contract, burdened with all kinds of conditions,
as if it were a bill of lading or a policy of
insurance. No one who could read could glance at
it without seeing that it undertook . . . to
prescribe the particulars which should govern
the conduct of the parties until the passengers
reached the port of destination. In such
circumstances, the act of acceptance gives rise to
an implication of assent.110
“Despite the eminence of its authorship the Murray
opinion did not at first have an enthusiastic reception in this
court,” Judge Friendly remarked.111 Several opinions found
Murray distinguishable and held for the passengers.112 But as
the steamship companies created more forceful notices, the
Second Circuit began to enforce the conditions. Discussing the
decisions that favored defendants, Judge Friendly made
statements like, “Examination of the record in Baron shows
that both these legends were in solid capitals.”113 He learned
these facts, not from the parties in his case, but by calling for
and personally examining the records in other cases.114 If he
could not distinguish cases from what appeared in the
published opinions, he was prepared to rely on information
that the courts did not include in their opinions.115 Judge
110. Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting Murray, 139 N.E. at 228 (citation
and internal quotation omitted)).
111. Id. at 15.
112. For a discussion of the opinions, see id.
113. Id. at 15-16 & n.4 (citing Baron v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 108 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1939)).
114. Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1967);
United States ex rel. La Near v. La Vallee, 306 F.2d 417, 421-22 (2d Cir.
1962); Interview with Paul Mogin, former clerk for Judge Friendly, in Wash.,
D.C. (Nov. 28, 2006).
115. Judge Friendly evidently exhumed the court record in at least two
other cases discussed in his opinion. While the nature of Friendly‟s research
is hardly central to this article, it is worth noting that his creativity and
diligence threatened to create problems, namely, that readers of opinions
could not be certain that another judge would not rely on matters not
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Friendly attributed the shift in outcomes favoring steamship
companies, in part, to:
the disparity in the results with respect to
steamship lines produced by the doctrine of The
Majestic as against those attained by other
carriers [railroads and Western Union] under the
rule that valid limitations in tariffs filed with
regulatory agencies of the United States are
binding, whether embodied in the transportation
documents . . . or not.116
It was still necessary to decide Silvestri‟s claim, and Judge
Friendly suggested a highly pragmatic standard that he
gleaned from his thorough review of the decisions:
[T]he thread that runs implicitly through the
cases sustaining incorporation is that the
steamship line had done all it reasonably could
to warn the passenger that the terms and
conditions were important matters of contract
affecting his legal rights . . . .
While we would not insist on any particular
rubric, seventy years of experience under The
Majestic doctrine should have enabled the
draftsman of the ticket to produce a warning
significantly more eye-catching than this. To be
sure, it can be said that all this is legalism, since
Silvestri should have known the Italian Line had
not gone to the trouble of printing the Terms and
contained in the opinion and thereby change its meaning. While engaging in
a tour de force, Friendly was unilaterally changing the rules of the game in a
potentially profound and disruptive way. Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 751 (4th ed.
2007) (“Citizens ought to be able to open up the statute books and find out
what the law requires of them.”).
116. Silvestri, 388 F.2d at 16-17 (citations omitted).
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Conditions for the fun of it and would not have
read them no matter what was said; and we
confess some doubt how far the intensity of ticket
reading by steamship passengers correlates with
the strength of the invitation to indulge in it. All
this, however, could have been said with equal
accuracy of the Misses Potter, yet The Majestic
decided what it did.117
Judge Friendly did not offer much hope to Mr. Silvestri.
After noting that Silvestri consulted a lawyer who should have
been aware of the Italian Line‟s limitations on the time for
bringing suit, and, moreover, that his lawyer may have
obtained a duplicate of Silvestri‟s ticket, Judge Friendly
abruptly ended the opinion: “If the company can establish that
because of the lawyer‟s advice or otherwise Silvestri knew that
the ticket required him to bring suit within a year, we might
have a different case. We hold only it was error to grant
summary judgment for respondent. Reversed.”118 Silvestri still
faced a difficult task, but he had a chance.
Judge Cardozo‟s biographer, Professor Andrew L. Kaufman
of Harvard Law School, recognized that Judge Cardozo was
often more charitable and reasonable than he was to Mr.
Murray.119 Nevertheless, Palsgraf, along with another case to
which Kaufman referred, suggest that Friendly was correct in
saying that Judge Cardozo was more interested in general
propositions than facts (or people):
For some unspecified reason, Cardozo simply was
not moved by his knowledge of common behavior
to apply the “method of sociology” in this case.
The logic of the rules won out. Rightly or
wrongly, and I think wrongly, Cardozo saw this
case as he had seen the case of the woman who

117. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 18.
119. KAUFMAN, supra note 3, at 356 (discussing Murray v. Cunard S.S.
Co., 139 N.E. 226 (N.Y. 1923).
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fell over the mechanic fixing the cash register.
People had to take responsibility to look out for
themselves sometimes, and Cardozo thought that
this was one of these times.120
Indeed, Judge Cardozo had a ready reason for deciding the case
for Mr. Murray—the company had collected his ticket after he
boarded, and one party to a contract ordinarily does not collect
the other party‟s copy—but he nevertheless held the line for
the company.121
Judge Friendly was willing to take a step that Judge
Cardozo was unwilling to take, namely, to accept the reality
that passengers do not read all the terms on a ticket because
they do not expect to find anything relevant to the main
purpose of buying a ticket. Judge Friendly seems to have been
more flexible and understanding than Judge Cardozo. Nearly
forty years after Murray, perhaps it was time to accept the fact
of life that travelers do not read the fine print on contracts and,
indeed, are not really expected to. What would happen if
renters of cars said, “One second, I want to read the contract”?
Judge Friendly was more willing than Judge Cardozo to accept
human behavior as a fact of life. Although he did not say so,
Friendly may have thought that this was a very good case for a
jury of Silvestri‟s peers to decide. What may have turned out to
be an even more important difference between the two jurists,
however, was that Judge Friendly and his wife took frequent
cruises, while Judge Cardozo rarely traveled.122 Summa cum
laude at Harvard College and Law School and Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judge
Friendly, and his wife, may not have read their passenger
tickets either.

120. Id. at 358. The reference was to Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr
Co., 177 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1931), where Cardozo had denied relief to a woman
who walked before she looked.
121. KAUFMAN, supra note 3, at 356.
122. Id. at 147-49, 472-73. Professor Kaufman did note that Judge
Cardozo had been on an ocean liner, although he did not say how many
times. Id. at 357-58. The implication was that it was a small number,
perhaps only one. See id.
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Happenstance may change the outcome of a case, and it
may have with Silvestri. Clerking for Judge Friendly at the
time of Silvestri was Bruce Ackerman, now a professor at Yale
Law School.123 Hiring brilliant law clerks, Judge Friendly
preferred them to be outspoken, and Ackerman took him at his
word.124 As Professor Ackerman has explained, Judge
Friendly‟s initial reaction was to affirm on the ground that the
notice provision was in the contract.125 Ackerman described
what happened next: “I handed him the contract and asked
him to read it. That was unfair; he couldn‟t read shit. But he
changed his mind.”126 As Ackerman (and others) well knew,
Judge Friendly‟s eyesight was poor and he had difficulty
reading even ordinary-sized print.
III.
While respectful, Judge Friendly was skeptical of Judge
Cardozo‟s approaches in Palsgraf and Murray, and was
inclined to be more generous to the plaintiffs and expand the
responsibilities of the defendants. Judge Friendly‟s opinion
implied that Palsgraf might be outdated because at least a
modicum of law and economics orientation, including looking at
who was in a better position to bear, share, or prevent the loss,
was appropriate nearly four decades after Judge Cardozo wrote
his opinion. In Silvestri Judge Friendly veered from formal
concepts like “incorporation” and asked the more practical
question whether the steamship company did all it reasonably
could to bring the notice requirement to the attention of the
passengers. He could have asked, but did not, which party was
better able to prevent or insure against the loss, although it
may have been in the back of his mind, as it was in the earlier
Kinsman.
123. Interview with Prof. Bruce Ackerman in New Haven, Conn. (Aug. 6,
2007).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Ackerman wrote the initial draft of Bushey, see id., an
unabashedly law and economics approach. Friendly‟s published opinion was
more traditional.
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